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Dit boek is een aaneenschakeling van essays geïnspireerd door het werk van Peter Achinstein, één van 
de meest prominente wetenschapsfilosofen van zijn generatie, Jay and Jeanier Schottenstein University 
Professor aan de Yeshiva Univerity, en professor aan Johns Hopkins University. Naast 8 volumes te 
hebben geedit, is Achinstein de auteur van 7 boeken, waaronder ‘The Nature of Explanation’ (1983), ‘The 
Book of Evidence’ (2003) en het recente ‘Evidence, Explanation, and Realism’ (2010). Zijn boek ‘Particles 
and Waves: Historical Essays in the Philosophy of Science’ (1991) kreeg de Lakatos Award in 1993, de 
meest prestigieuse prijs voor een wetenschapsfilosofisch boek. Vreemd genoeg, is dit volume het eerste 
boek dat volledig gewijd wordt aan Achinstein’s ideeën en de reacties hierop. 
 
Dit boek bestaat uit 19 korte essays die verscheidene aspecten van Achinstein’s corpus adresseren, elk 
gevolgd door gevatte reacties van de meester zelf. Sommige leggen zijn visies uit, sommigen bekritiseren 
ze, andere breiden ze uit en sommigen doen het alle drie. Hoofdstuk 1, geschreven door Steven Gimbel 
en Jeffrey Maynes, presenteert een historisch overzicht van Achinstein’s wetenschapsfilosofische 
aanpak; de daaropvolgende bijdragen zijn in alfabetische volgorde geordend naar auteur. Alle 
behandelen zij Achinstein’s meest recente werk over de notie van wetenschappelijk bewijs. Nancy 
Cartwright, Gerald Doppelt, Philip Kitcher, Helen Longino, Deborah Mayo, Richard Richards en Kent 
Staley onderzoeken allen hoe het Achinstein’s conceptie van wetenschappelijk bewijs vergaat als deze 
geconfronteerd wordt met een breed gamma gevalsstudies of wanneer zijn visie vergelijken wordt met 
tegenstrijdige visies op bewijs. Richard Richards, bijvoorbeeld, argumenteert hoe en waarom 
Achinstein’s bewijstheorie, in tegenstelling tot standaardtheorieën over bewijs, in staat is om te gaan 
met raadselachtige episodes in de wetenschapsgeschiedenis. Zo behandelt hij Charles Darwin’s geloof in 
evolutie volgens aftakking vooraleer deze een mechanisme (later bekend als natuurlijke selectie) 
beschikbaar had, en diens klaarblijkelijk inconsistente visies over het al dan niet gejustifieerd zijn van 
deze gedachtegang. Specifieker kunnen Achinstein’s noties van ‘subjective’ en ‘epistemic situation 
evidence’ hier een rol van betekenis spelen. ‘Subjective evidence’ is bewijs dat afhangt van wat een 
bepaald subject geloofd en waarom deze iets geloofd, terwijl ‘epistemic situation evidence’ objectieve 
bewijs omvat aangezien dit niet afhangt van de werkelijke overtuigingen van individuen maar relatief is 
aan een epistemische situatie binnen een bepaald tijdskader. ‘Subjective evidence’ geeft ons een 
descriptief raamwerk om dergelijke historische episodes te kaderen, terwijl het idee van ‘epistemic 
situation’ ons de hulpmiddelen verstrekt om de prescriptieve vraag relatief aan een verscheidenheid van 
contexten op te werpen. 
 
De werken van Victor Di Fate, Frederick Kronz en John Norton onderzoeken de rol van inductie in 
wetenschappelijke methodologie, een onderwerp dat niet ongerelateerd is aan een eigenlijke 
benadering van wetenschappelijk bewijs. James Woodward en Adam Goldstein behandelen vragen 
gerelateerd aan Achinstein’s pragmatische theorie van verklaring. Gregory Morgan beschouwt 
Achinstein’s interpretatie van William Whewell, en Michael Ruse plaatst Achinstein’s vroege werk over 
analogieën in theoretische wetenschap. Een typerend kenmerk van Achinstein’s wetenschapsfilosofie is 
het gebruik van de geschiedenis van de fysica om filosofische visies te illustreren en inspireren. Larry 
Laudan beschouwt Achinstein’s gebruik van het 19de eeuwse golf-deeltjesdebat om de kracht van 
inductivisme en hypothetisch-deductivisme te achterhalen. Stathis Psillos en Bas van Fraassen 
benadrukken Jean Perrin’s relatie tot het realisme-antirealismedebat en hoe Achinstein Perrin’s 
redeneren gebruikt om wetenschappelijk realisme te verdedigen. Jordi Cat beschouwt Achinstein’s 
meest recente artikel dat zich toelegt op een interpretatie van James Clerk Maxwell’s methodologie.  
 
De titel van dit werk is geïnspireerd door Achinstein’s poging om een wetenschapsfilosofie te 
construeren die nuttig zou kunnen zijn voor wetenschappers in het veld. Een terugkerende anekdote 
doorheen de papers is Achinstein’s aanhef van zijn boek ‘The Book of Evidence’ waarin hij zijn aanvaring 
met de decaan van Johns Hopkins University beschrijft. De decaan daagt Achinstein, en menig ander 
wetenschapsfilosoof, uit eindelijk eens een wetenschapsfilosofie te produceren die van nut kan zijn voor 
wetenschappers. Of Achinstein dit ideaal al dan niet bereikt heeft doorheen zijn carrière laat ik open 
voor de lezer. Op zijn minst, dit doel voor ogen stellen is een bruikbare heuristiek bij het schrijven van 
goede wetenschapsfilosofie. 
 
Peter Achinstein heeft, naar de woorden van de editor, “perfected the fine balance between stinging 
criticism of poor argumentation and cheerleading the pursuit of academic excellence”, wat hem tot een 
uitstekende mentor en adviseur maakt. Als men één boodschap van zijn werk mag meenemen is het wel 
dat het steeds belangrijk is filosofische strengheid te combineren met historische gevoeligheid.  
 
Dit boek is dan ook geen ordinair Festschrift, aangezien de bijdragen Achinstein’s werk direct 
confronteren en hem dwingen om op nieuwe manieren over zijn visies na te denken, implicaties te zien 
die hij voordien niet inzag,e n compacte antwoorden te formuleren die de lezers in staat stellen zijn 
visies duidelijker te begriijpen en identificeren. Waar hij meer dan behoorlijk in geslaagd is. 
 
 
 
In all his work, he  
combines historical expertise with an unfailing sense for  
when formal precision is in place and with a natural  
approach to conceptual analysis. 
 
11: book of evidence (2001): “Peter, you have never made a contribution of interest to scientists.” (p.3) 
Achinstein acknowledges that the dean is not only rights that philosophical theories of evidence are 
ignored by scientists, but that they ought to be ignored, “because they propose concepts of evidence 
that are based on assumptions incompatible with ones scientists make when they speak of, and offer, 
evidence for hypotheses” (p.3) 
 
44: victor di fate: One unmistakable characteristic of Peter Achinstein’s work on scientific method is his 
emphasis that certain issues, often assumed by philosophers to be logical or conceptual matters, really 
have an empirical character. Achinstein is not alone, of course, in arguing that empirical information is 
indispensable for methodology, even among his contemporaries; but he does have a distinct point to 
make. 
Rather, it is that scientists themselves contribute to the resolution of methodological issues through the 
empirical information obtained in the normal process of investigating our world, as well as by their own 
methods and procedures. 
 
45: the title of this chapter refers to Achinstein’s empiricism as Newtonian because, as will be argued 
here, there is good reason to think that Newton and Achinstein share strikingly similar views on the 
empirical character of certain issues in the epistemology of science, and on the contribution that 
scientists make in deciding them. 
 
59-60: Doppelt: Achinstein’s aim is to provide a conception of evidence that (1) captures the 
assumptions of scientists when they claim that certain facts e constitute evidence that a certain 
hypothesis h is true; and (2) can resolve scientific disagreements concerning what is evidence for what . I 
call this aim the test of relevance to scientist’s inferential practices. Achinstein argues that standard 
philosophical conceptions of evidence – Bayesianism, hypothetico-deductive accounts, enumeratative 
induction views, inference-to-the-best-explanation, and others fail the relevance test. They fail for three 
reasons. First, these standard accounts are too weak to capture the conditions under which scientists 
take facts e to be evidence for some hypothesis h. Scientists do not take e to be evidence for h if and 
only if it satisfies the Bayesian condition of increasing the probability of h over its prior probability; 
similarly, they do not take e to be evidence for h if and only if h deductively implies e and e occurs, as the 
hypothetico-deductive account claims. The second failing of such standard accounts of evidence is that 
they offer a priori analysis of the notion, whereas an empirical approach is more promising. The third 
failing is that they fall short of the notion of objectivity operative in successful scientific inquiry. 
Achinstein has provided a demanding standard for evaluating his own account of evidence. I argue that 
his account falls short of meeting his “relevance test” and that a rival scientific realist account of 
evidence promises more success.  
 
72: Goldstein: The nature of explanation is a central theme of Peter Achinstein’s work, as indicated by his 
book of that title. He has consistently advanced a view that may be alternatively called the pragmatic 
view, the illocutionary theory, or contextualism about explanation. Moreover, he can lay title, I think, to 
the claim of having elaborated this view in greater detail, and with greater breadth, than any other 
philosopher. Bas van Fraassen might be considered by many to be a contender for this title – although 
according to Achisntein, van Fraassen is not even in the game: one of Achinstein’s bolder claims is that 
van Fraassen’s views about explanation, advanced as pragmatic, are not so at all. 
Achinstein’s pragmatism informs a pluralistic view: there are many kinds of good explanations, because 
success in explanation depends on features of the context in which the explanation is requested. 
 
81: Goldstein: My defense of pragmatism about explanation is intended to challenge the claim that 
scientific explanations have a single aim – the central aim of universalism about explanation. I propose 
that an explanation aiming at promoting scientific advance is better, all other things being equal, than 
one that does not. I also propose that science aims at responding to deeper curiosities about human 
nature and our place – small though it may be – in the universe. I believe that these two aims of science 
are important enough, and that the case I present concerning alternative explanations of population-
genetic change is compelling enough to establish that universalism about explanation is in error. 
Besides the intrinsic importance of this result, it plays an important role in the larger project of 
characterizing the explanatory strategies used by evolutionary biologists. The population-genetic models 
I offer as evidence can be interpreted along Hempelian lines, because, as I mentioned above, they are 
true empirical generalizations that can support counterfactuals, and so are laws of nature. In addition, I 
claim, there is an important role for historical explanations in evolutionary biology. Arguing for this claim 
takes direct aim at Hempelianism, because it aims to displace explanation-seeking why-questions as the 
sole kind of explanation-seeking questions asked by scientists. What remains is to describe these 
strategies of historical explanation by characterizing the kinds of explanation-seeking questions they are 
intended to answer, and the contexts in which they most naturally arise. 
 
85: Kitcher: let the utilitarian dean speak: Peter, this is all very clever. You are very good at thinking up 
examples to show what is wrong with particular proposals, and you show that your own suggestion – 
that evidence requires a probability greater than half of an explanatory connection between hypothesis 
and evidence – survives the various cases you have used to test other ideas. But how do we scientists 
figure out these probability judgments? Most of the time you deal with toy examples, in which the 
probabilities come for free; occasionally that’s true in scientific research, but most of the time it isn’t. 
 
87: Kitcher: scientific rationality: my own view is that there are genuine difficulties in weighing and 
balancing evidence, that these are indeed prominent in the episodes studies by Kuhn, that they are not 
intractable, and that they occur in a variety of scientific contexts. I think the utilitarian dean would like 
philosophers to provide him with clear ways of sorting out these situations, and the contemplative dean 
would like some account of what goes on when scientists actually do sort them out. 
 
88: Kitcher: Scientists have a conception of scientific responsibility that embodies: (R) A scientist, S, is 
responsible only if S’s judgments accord with the evidence. What is it for a judgment to accord with the 
evidence? To a first approximation, we might say that there are three forms of judgment: one may 
accept a statement, reject it, or withhold assent; judgment accords with the evidence just in case one 
accepts those statements that are supported by the totality of available evidence, rejects those whose 
negations are supported by the totality of available evidence, and withholds assent in cases where 
neither the statement nor its negation is supported by the totality of available evidence. 
 
96: Kronz: Following Newton and Mill, Peter Achinstein maintains in Evidence, Explanation, and Realism 
that there are universal rules of induction. He also maintains that such rules may be formalized, but that 
their validity cannot be determined formally, as in deduction. More precisely, he maintains that 
inductive inferences are warranted by material facts or empirical assumptions, in contrast with deductive 
inferences in logic and mathematics, which can be evaluated by formal means alone. These elements of 
Achinstein’s view are provisionally accepted. Two additional components of his view, that induction and 
hypothetico-deduction are mutually exclusive and that induction is the core of the scientific method, are 
not. The corresponding themes defended here are that induction and hypothetico-deduction are 
mutually complementary, that one is not subsidiary to the other, and that the scientific context 
determines which of the two modes is most appropriate.  
 
135: Mayo: Achinstein: the problem with philosophical accounts is (1) they are far too weak to give 
scientists what they want from evidence, and (2) they make the evidential relationship a priori whereas 
establishing claims of evidence requires empirical investigation. From this agreement it became clear 
that we share fundamental theses about evidence. As Achinstein has recently noted, we concur “that 
whether e, if true, is evidence that h, in the most important sense of ‘evidence’, is an objective fact, not a  
Subjective one of the sort many Bayesians have in mind. We agree further that it is an empirical fact, not 
an a priori one of the sort Carnap has in mind.” 
 
191: Richards: in his book of evidence, Achinstein lays out what would be required for a concept of 
evidence to be useful for scientists. First, it must be strong enough to warrant belief in a hypothesis – not 
merely raise its probability. Second, it must be empirical – not a priori, semantic, or merely 
mathematical. In other words, scientists assume that evidence provides a good reason to believe a 
hypothesis – not just some reason, and on the basis of the empirical facts, and not just logical or formal 
relations either. 
 
Comments: 
255: According to Achinstein (1984), an explanation-sentence is “strongly pragmatic” if (1) it contains 
terms that refer to an explainer or audience and (ii) the truth-value of the explanation-sentence can vary 
with the person giving or receiving the explanation. 
 
259: Cartwright an I use somewhat different terminologies, but she is right in claiming that evidence 
(which she also calls “evidential relevance”) requires correct explanation. Even if p(h/e) or p(e/h) are 
high, ore even if p(h/e) > p(h), this is not sufficient. On my own view, e is (veridical) evidence that h (the 
kind that scientists in general seek), given background information b, if and only if (1) p (there is an 
explanatory connection between h and e/e&b) > ½; (2) e, b, and h are all true; (3) e does not entail h; 
and (4) (in the strongest and most interesting type of veridical evidence) there is an explanatory 
connection between h and e. By an explanatory connection between h and e I mean that the fact that e 
is true correctly explains why h is true; or the fact that h is true correctly explains why e is true; or some 
hypothesis correctly explains why both e and h are true. 
 
266: my aim is to define a concept of evidence that is “relevant” to scientists in the sense that it reflects 
what scientists actually seek when they seek evidence. 
 
267: pragmatic account of explanation: on this view an explanation is something that provides an answer 
to certain types of questions – an answer that can be given in an act of explaining. 
 
287-288: Richards: I his essay Richards concentrates on a very interesting but puzzling claim made by 
Darwin, namely, that although he (Darwin) at one point came to believe in branching evolution on the 
basis of the taxonomic facts, and he believed that he was justified in doing so, he also believed that 
these same taxonomic facts were not sufficient for other scientists to believe in branching evolution. B 
the latter, according to Richards, Darwin means not that these taxonomic facts would fail to persuade 
others to believe, but that others would not be justified in so believing. =Richards rightfully finds this 
puzzling as asks how it can be explained. Using my concept o ES (Epistemic Situation) evidence, he claims 
that what Darwin was saying is that relative to the sort of epistemic situation he (Darwin) was in, the 
taxonomic facts did provide ES-evidence; but others were in a different sort of epistemic situation, 
relative to which the taxonomic facts did not provide such evidence. 
 
288: More frequently they (historians of science) are concerned with simply identifying the reasons 
scientists in fact had for believing what they did, whether these reasons are epistemic or non-epistemic 
(the latter including causal factors influencing those beliefs). But evaluating those beliefs, particularly in 
the way Richards suggests, is a much more difficult task. It involves not only 
(1) discovering what reason e the scientist had for believing h, 
But also 
(2) identifying what particular epistemic situation the scientist was in (which, among other things, 
involves identifying what beliefs other than e and h he had or was in a position to have), 
And 
(3) determining whether anyone in that epistemic situation would have been justified in believing h for 
the reason e 
 
297: woodward: I will raise just one question. Can’t there be “unstable” causes? Woodward’s “stability” 
condition is concerned with the extent to which the relationship between cause C and effect E will 
continue to hold as various background factors change, where a background factor is any factor distinct 
from C and E. Now think of those scary warnings on prescription blurbs for pills, for example, “this pill 
can cause stomach upset.” Suppose that the pill caused John’s stomach upset yesterday, but not today 
when he took another one. (We rule out other causes one by one.) C can cause E (the blurb tells us, 
although this is rare), and yesterday it did in John’s case, but there isn’t much “stability” here, since if 
background conditions distinct from C and E change, the causal connection will probably not exist. To be 
sure, Woodward says that “stability” is not a necessary condition for the selection of a cause, only a 
“relevant” one. Whether this is so, and also what exactly is supposed to count as “stable”, are questions I 
will leave for Jim for another occasion. But I do welcome his pragmatism in these matters. 
 
 
Elliott Sober: “historians and sociologists study science as it is, whereas philosophers of science study 
science as it ought to be. Philosophy of science is a normative discipline.” (2008, XV). (‘Evidence and 
Evolution: the logic behind the science’ Cambridge University Press: Cambridge University). Elliott Sober 
claims that the philosophy of science is a normative discipline, telling us what science should be like. 
That may be true, but that fact does not require that philosophy of science ignore the descriptive and 
contextual. An adequate philosophy of science must be able to help us understand the complexities of 
the history of science, as scientists came to believe their hypotheses on the basis of empirical facts, and 
in light of what they were in a position to know or believe.  
